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1The translaborative case for a translational hermeneutics 
Alexa Alfer
University of Westminster
This paper takes the notion of translaboration as a stepping stone for an exploration of 
some of the recent debates about translational hermeneutics. In doing so, it aims to 
expand translaboration’s focus beyond concrete collaborations between multiple 
translators, or authors and translators, and to think about, and theorise, translaboration 
as a possible means of framing textual agents reading and writing each other within 
texts. The argument presented draws on both Hans-Georg Gadamer’s and Paul 
Ricoeur’s conceptions of the individual subject as interpretative agent, and of 
translation as an object of philosophical enquiry, and adopts the concept of a 
“hermeneutics of decipherment” (Maitland 2017, 38) as an alternative to dialogic 
models of understanding and translating. Similarly, the relationship between 
philosophical and translational hermeneutics is interrogated and recast as a 
translaborative endeavour rather than as an immediately reciprocal dialogue. 
Translaboration, this paper argues, thus also actively furthers the move away from 
what Blumczynski (2016, 29) calls “an arborescent epistemological paradigm” of 
interdisciplinarity and contributes to animating a transdisciplinarity that is 
fundamentally “rhizomatic” (ibid.; see Deleuze and Guattari 2004) in nature.
Keywords: translation, understanding, hermeneutics, transdisciplinarity, 
translaboration
21. Introduction
A central aim behind the ‘blended’ concept (Fauconnier and Turner 1998) of translaboration 
has been to provide a framework for exploring and articulating connections, comparisons and 
confluences between translation and collaboration, positing these as inherently allied notions. 
At its most basic level, translaboration acknowledges “the reality that, for better or worse, 
translation is frequently collaborative in nature” (Jansen and Wegener 2013, 5). More broadly, 
however, translaboration also responds to the more fundamental insight that, as Cordingley and 
Frigau Manning (2017, 23) put it, 
we are never alone when translating… conversing – virtually or otherwise – with an 
always hypothetical author and a necessarily imagined reader, while making translation 
decisions based on cultural worlds which possess us and are possessed by us. We are 
ourselves vectors of actions, discourses, influences, which pervade us, and which 
themselves intersect at ambivalent and moving junctures within the many discourses of 
the self.
In spite of the multiplicity, multidimensionality and relationality of translation thus conceived 
and of the web of interpretive agents that activates translation, most of the contributions made 
to contouring the notion of translaboration to date (see Alfer 2017) have focused on concrete 
collaborations among human agents in the translation process. Part of the aim of this paper is 
to redress that imbalance by probing the productive interplay of textual agents, not only in 
translation but also in interpretative processes more generally, from a translaborative 
perspective. Specifically, translaboration, viewed as a textual practice in and of itself, here 
inserts itself into recent debates about translational hermeneutics to explore, on the one hand, 
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the relationship between philosophical hermeneutics and translation itself should be viewed as 
a textual and translational, rather than a dialogic, endeavour. 
Hermeneutics has enjoyed increased attention in Translation Studies of late (e.g., 
Robinson 1991, 2013; Stolze 1992, 2003; Cercel 2009, 2013; Stolze, Stanley, and Cercel 2015; 
Cercel, Agnetta, and Amido Lozano 2017; Stanley et al. 2018; but also, more broadly, Venuti 
2010, 2013, 2019; Blumczynski 2016; Maitland 2017). Much of this attention has focused on, 
and often grappled with, an application of philosophical hermeneutics to translation so as to 
appraise translational processes and phenomena in a more holistic rather than empirically 
atomised fashion (e.g., Blumczynski 2016), and to account, inter alia, for the translator’s 
subjectivity in the translation process (Cercel 2015; Maitland 2017; Stolze 2018). Similarly, 
hermeneutic approaches to translation allow us to situate translational creativity (e.g., Cercel 
2013; Cercel, Agnetta, and Amido Lozano 2017) within a perpetually interpretative 
(inter)textuality that is constitutive of, rather than incidental to, translational action. Creativity 
is thus posited as both condition and actualisation of productive translational thinking, rather 
than as an “unconscious” (Aranda 2009, 33) and thus vexingly elusive category, or as a mere 
problem-solving strategy among others (Mackenzie 1998, 201). Hermeneutic thinking has, 
likewise, been drawn upon to establish translation itself as “a transdisciplinary paradigm” 
(Blumczynski 2016, 4). Harnessing Steiner’s (1998, chapter 1) dictum of “understanding as 
translation,” Blumczynski (2016, 34) argues that 
when translation is reconceptualised in relation to hermeneutics, it acquires a strongly 
philosophical note and becomes a phenomenon, a field, a mode of being, a way of 
thinking, a manner of representation, close to its meaning in the phrase ‘translation 
studies’. 
4Maitland (2017), meanwhile, locates translation in Steiner’s (1998, 49) “middle” space of 
“interpretive decipherment” and constructs her argument for a critical and politically effective 
conception of ‘cultural translation’ by “shift[ing] the locus of philosophical hermeneutics to 
address the deliberate, purposeful acts of interpretation that aim to impact specific audiences 
in specific ways” (Maitland 2017, 53). For her, translation, “as an interpretive genre,” thus 
“means transformation” (159).  
The most longstanding advocate of hermeneutical thinking in Translation Studies is, of 
course, Stolze (1992, 2003, 2011), and the most sustained research initiatives of recent years 
pushing for a more prominent place of hermeneutics within translational thinking have also 
come from the German tradition. This is most visibly embodied in the 2011 and 2013 Cologne 
symposia on ‘Translational Hermeneutics’, which resulted in two illuminating volumes 
entitled, respectively, Translational Hermeneutics: The First Symposium (Stolze, Stanley, and 
Cercel 2015) and Philosophy and Practice in Translational Hermeneutics (Stanley et al. 2018). 
The prominence of the German tradition is perhaps not surprising given, on the one hand, the 
generally accepted genealogy of modern hermeneutics that is commonly assumed to start with 
Schleiermacher and moves along through Dilthey and Heidegger to Gadamer, and, on the other, 
the traditional dominance of Linguistics-informed approaches in German Translation Studies, 
against which this push for a hermeneutic approach is also a push-back. The way in which the 
overarching themes of the two Cologne symposia were framed certainly suggests an acute 
awareness of the uphill struggle “to gain recognition [for hermeneutics] as a viable theory and 
methodology” in the face of “a significant level of distrust of hermeneutics in fields dominated 
by the empirical approach to research… but also in the humanities” (Stanley et al. 2018, 7).  
Largely unencumbered by an all too intimate knowledge of the German push for, no 
less, “this new discipline: Translational Hermeneutics” (Stanley et al. 2018, 8), or indeed by 
5sustained engagement with other Translation Studies scholars explicitly or implicitly deploying 
hermeneutic approaches to a wide range of translational questions (among them Robinson 
1991, 2012, 2013; Tymoczko 2014; Liu 1995; and many others), Venuti has also long argued 
for a “hermeneutic model that views translation as an interpretive act, as the inscription of one 
interpretive possibility among others” (Venuti 2013, 4). Venuti (2019, 6) uses his latest 
offering, Contra Instrumentalism: A Translation Polemic, to consolidate this argument by (a) 
reiterating that “all translation is… an interpretative act,” and (b) throwing down the gauntlet 
to what he calls the instrumentalist model of translation. Instrumentalism, Venuti (ibid.) argues, 
has dominated translational thinking since at least Cicero and Jerome and not only enjoys 
continued discursive hegemony, but has, in the process, also systematically side-lined the 
hermeneutic model. Interestingly, Venuti, similar to Stolze, Stanley, and Cercel (2015) and 
Stanley et al. (2018) frames his call for intensifying attention to a hermeneutical approach to 
translation in terms of struggle and combat, David and Goliath fashion, with instrumentalism 
(Venuti 2013, 2019) or empiricism (Stolze, Stanley, and Cercel 2015) cast as the oppressive 
(of hermeneutics) and repressive (of the inevitably interpretative nature of translation) overlord 
against which plucky little hermeneutics struggles to gain discursive purchase.
Such rhetoric of struggle and strife probably owes more to academic jostling than to 
actual and active battles being mounted on either side of this somewhat artificially drawn 
divide, but let us nevertheless assume, for the moment, that hermeneutics does need a leg-up, 
and does indeed need defending against “a significant level of distrust” (Stanley et al. 2018, 7) 
from more empirically-oriented schools of thought. This assumption throws up a number of 
interesting points. I would, in particular, like to look closely at two specific areas of concern 
that both have an impact on, and are in turn inflected by, a translaborative contouring of 
translational hermeneutics. They concern, respectively, the agents and the domains of, on the 
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relationship between Translation Studies and Philosophy as such.
2. The trouble with subjective tendencies
If, as Stanley et al. (2018, 7) have it, “hermeneutics has struggled to gain recognition as a viable 
theory and methodology of interpretation,” this struggle is arguably rooted to no small degree 
in “the subjective tendencies inherent in hermeneutics” (9; see also Stanley 2012) – tendencies 
that, according to Stanley et al. (2018, 7) need “counter[ing].” These tendencies are perceived 
to derive from “the relationship between the individual subject and the hermeneutical approach 
to understanding” (ibid.); a relationship, that is, which puts the individual subject as interpretive 
agent at the operative centre of meaning-making. In respect of translation-as-interpretation, 
Maitland (2017, 160–161) formulates the resulting dilemma as follows: “If every translation is 
contingent upon the subjectivity of the translator behind it… then no translation can stand as 
final.” For Maitland, however, the inevitable and illimitable plurality of possible translations 
that follows presents an opportunity to conceive of translation as a category, as well as a 
concrete act, of critique and activism that saves us “from the totalism that accompanies our 
own attempts at understanding” (161; see also Robinson 2015). For scholars like Stolze (2018), 
meanwhile, the centrality of the individual subject as interpretive agent to the hermeneutic 
approach to understanding enables us to re-inscribe “translators as persons” (Stanley et al. 
2018, 9) into enquiries of translational action, and to account for the role of the (cognitive – 
existential – individual) translating subject in the translation process. This has not least fostered 
the emergence of what Hu (2004) diagnoses as an increasingly prominent trend for ‘translator-
centredness’ in recent Translation Studies research. All of these are surely welcome 
developments that have been crucially enabled by the central place afforded to the interpretive 
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translating subject necessarily complicit in perpetuating “subjective tendencies inherent in 
hermeneutics” (Stanley et al. 2018, 9; see also Stanley 2012)? And do these tendencies 
necessarily exist in the first place? 
According to Stolze (2018, 95), the translator’s understanding of a source text is merely 
triggered (“angestoßen”) by the textual structures of this source, as it is “gar nicht die 
Textelemente als solche, welche den Sinn konstituieren” (actually not the textual elements as 
such that constitute meaning). Hence,
der Bezugspunkt der Übersetzung ist nicht die Gestalt des Ausgangstextes, sondern die 
inhaltliche Formulierungsabsicht des Translators. Wie ein Koautor versucht der 
Translator die verstandene Textmitteilung zielsprachlich in einer für mögliche oder 
intendierte Leser verständlichen Weise auszuformulieren, nachdem er sie sich “in 
Empathie” angeeignet hat. 
(the point of reference for a translation is not the gestalt of the source text, but rather 
the translator’s intention of articulation. Like a co-author, the translator tries to 
formulate the understood message of the source text for a potential or intended 
readership in an intelligible way, having appropriated it “in empathy”.) (ibid.)
Translation is thus an appropriatively collaborative co-authoring operation performed on both 
source and target text by a translating subject that is conceived as empathetic, “responsible” 
(85), and ideally in congenial communion (“geistesverwandt”) with both the source text and 
its author (Cercel 2015, 121). Importantly, however, this translating subject is ultimately 
conceived as external to the text(s). In this scheme of things, “die Persönlichkeit des 
Übersetzers, seine kognitive und emotionale Beziehung zum übersetzten Text sowie seine 
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and emotional relationship to the text to be translated, and their ability to identify with the 
message) become decisive factors in the translation process (118). Such emphasis on the 
translator’s personality and disposition does, however, also raise the double spectre of semantic 
solipsism and/or radical relativity, and it is this unsettling double spectre that, presumably, lies 
at the heart of Stanley et al.’s (2018, 9) discomfort with “the subjective tendencies” that are 
conceived of, on the one hand, as “inherent in hermeneutics” but, on the other, as extrinsic to 
the text(s) to which the methods of translational hermeneutics are applied. 
The key to countering the destabilising effect of these “tendencies,” according to 
Stanley et al. (2018, 9), lies in “considering frameworks of understanding that go beyond the 
individual subject [to] what one might call super, or supra-individual frameworks.” Such supra-
individual frameworks, and many contributions to the development of a translational 
hermeneutics more generally (e.g., Stolze 1992, 2003, 2011, 2018; Kohlmayer 2015; O’Keeffe 
2015, 2018; Blumczynski 2016), draw heavily on Gadamer’s anti-subjectivism, where the 
(problematic) subject overcomes itself or is drawn beyond itself and the linguistically 
conditioned finitude of its capacity for knowing, in the experience of inter-subjectivity. 
Blumczynski (2016), for example, takes up this theme in his rehabilitation of the notion of 
simpatico, rejected by Venuti (2008, 238) on the grounds of its perpetuation of conventions 
that read translations “as the transparent expression of authorial psychology,” but recovered by 
Strowe (2011) where the “perceived affinity between translator and author” (quoted in 
Blumczynski 2016, 46) is conceived as “a living relationship – not a static configuration – that 
is perceived, i.e. is phenomenological and not ontological, subjective and not objective, 
context-bound and not stable” (Blumczynski 2016, 46). Such a “living relationship,” for 
Blumczynski, leads to an encounter between translator and author that we, as readers, can 
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of self and the Other and the experience of affinity with SOMEONE” (ibid.; emphasis in original).
For Gadamer (2004, 399) himself, “thanks to the verbal nature of all interpretation, 
every interpretation includes the possibility of a relationship with others. There can be no 
speaking that does not bind the speaker and the person spoken to.” Accordingly, the process of 
understanding a text is conceived in parallel to two interlocutors reaching understanding of/on 
a subject matter (die Sache) in dialectic dialogue with one another: 
When we try to examine the hermeneutic phenomenon through the model of 
conversation between two persons, the chief thing that these apparently so different 
situations – understanding a text and reaching an understanding in a conversation – 
have in common is that both are concerned with a subject matter that is placed before 
them. Just as each interlocutor is trying to reach agreement on some subject with his 
partner, so also the interpreter is trying to understand what the text is saying. (370)
The problematics inherent in defining the object of understanding as “what the text is saying” 
are, of course, manifold. Venuti (2013, 4), for example, rejects “the German tradition of 
hermeneutics – notably the work of Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer” on the grounds that 
their “aim is to disclose an essentialist meaning in the source text.” In Gadamer (2004), at least, 
such essentialism is, however, not as readily diagnosable as Venuti’s one-line dismissal 
suggests. Gadamer (2004, 296) himself states that “not just occasionally but always, the 
meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is not merely a 
reproductive but always a productive activity.” Similarly, Gadamer (2004, 390) cautions that 
“the meaning of a text is not to be compared with an immovably and obstinately fixed point of 
view that suggests only one question to the person trying to understand it.” Rather, “the text is 
10
made to speak through interpretation” (398), with interpretation conceived as a perpetually 
dialectic and thus open-ended dialogue between “der verstehenden Person und de[m] Zu-
Verstehenden” (the understanding person and that which is to be understood) (Stolze 2018, 
90). 
Nevertheless, the privileging of the oral and aural over the written and read implied in 
“trying to understand what the text is saying” (Gadamer 2004, 370; emphasis added) when it 
is “made to speak” (398; emphasis added) – a privileging that is also present in Blumczynski’s 
(2016, 49) “organic relationship between thinking, speaking, and translating” – points to a 
problematic in Gadamer’s conception of understanding-through-interpretation that is linked to 
the conceptual parallelism set up between the interpretation of texts and the conversational path 
to understanding between two interlocutors. As O’Keeffe (2018, 16) points out, “Texts do not 
‘speak’. Interpretation is not a ‘conversation’.” Gadamer’s own qualification of this point 
readily concedes the limits of the orality metaphor, but retains the conversational figure of 
thought to gesture towards the supra-individual nature of understanding: “It is true that a text 
does not speak to us in the same way as does a Thou. We who are attempting to understand 
must ourselves make it speak” (Gadamer 2004, 370). Nevertheless, “this kind of understanding, 
‘making the text speak’, is not an arbitrary procedure that we undertake on our own initiative” 
(ibid.).
The privileging of the (speaking and hearing) body over the (written and read) text 
supports, first and foremost, this conversational gesture towards supra-individual 
understanding, but it also directs us, once again, to a positioning of the 
interpreting/understanding subject outside of the text to which it applies itself and which we, 
in turn, “apply… to ourselves” (Gadamer 2004, 399). O’Keeffe (2018, 19) suggests “the idea 
of an act of reading that takes writing ‘inside’ the body, where it would ‘lose’ its exteriority, 
lose its page, and become an acoustic phenomenon – meaning to be heard in the intimacy of 
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the echo chamber of an inner ear.” However, such an echo chamber, I would suggest, only adds 
to, rather than delivers the argument from, our double spectre of solipsistic subjectivity and 
semantic relativism that accompanies such exteriority, and ultimately returns us, again, to 
dialogue as the means of overcoming the limits of individual subjectivities.1 
Dialogicity is, for Gadamer (2004, 102–103), characterised, firstly, by play(fulness), 
which “fulfils its purpose only if the player loses himself in play.” Thus, “play, as an 
interpretive experience” (Kirby and Graham 2016, 13) offers a template for inter-subjective 
engagement with the object of understanding or the subject matter (die Sache) to the extent to 
which it is conceived “as transaction, rather than inter-action” and “takes place not between, 
but among, its players” (ibid.). 
Playfully dialogic understanding, secondly, is both predicated on and engenders a 
“fusion of horizons” (Gadamer 2004, 370) not only between the interlocutors/players or the 
reader and the text (as interlocutor or Sache), but also, crucially, between the interpreting 
subject and the historicity or traditional embeddedness of the subject(s) themselves, the subject 
matter, and the language in which all of these encounter one another (305). “Part of real 
understanding,” Gadamer writes, “is that we regain the concepts of a historical past in such a 
way that they also include our own comprehension of them” (367). Consequently, 
“understanding is certainly not concerned with ‘understanding historically’ – in other words, 
1
 An alternative to the echo chamber of the individual body as the site of hermeneutic understanding can, of course, 
be found in Robinson’s somatic theory of translation (Robinson 1991, 2012, 2013), which offers a view of 
embodied dialogicity that is fundamentally social – and socially constructed – and anchors Schleiermacher’s 
hermeneutics, against Gadamer (2004), in “the situated phenomenology (Gefühl or feeling) of an actual living, 
breathing, embodied human being in a spoken dialogical encounter with another living, breathing, embodied 
human being” (Robinson 2013, 12; see also Blumczynski 2016, 43–49).
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reconstructing the way the text came into being,” but rather actualises an intention “to 
understand the text itself,” an operation in which
the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he 
maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play 
and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says. (390)
Thirdly, “the fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement 
of language” (370; emphasis in original). As Foran (2018, 91) points out, for Gadamer, all 
thought is, in fact, “made possible by the fact of language.” In Gadamer’s scheme, however, 
this does not amount, as it would for Derrida and others, to a “claim that there is only 
understanding in language, but rather that understanding is what it is and the way it is because 
of language” (ibid., emphasis in original) – or, in Gadamer’s (2004, 441) words, because of the 
fundamentally “linguistic constitution of the world.” Consequently, “the kind of understanding 
we have, which is the only understanding there is, is always inflected by the fact of language” 
(Foran 2018, 91; emphasis in original). It is in this sense that, for Gadamer (2004, 370–371), 
our
understanding of the subject matter must take the form of language. It is not that the 
understanding is subsequently put into words; rather, the understanding occurs – 
whether in the case of a text or a dialogue with another person who raises an issue with 
us – in the coming-into-language of the thing itself. 
Language, or “the verbal aspect of interpretation” (398), thus both delineates the limits of the 
interpreting subject’s understanding and animates the dialogue that lifts the subject beyond 
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these limits to a shared understanding “that is not only mine or my author’s, but common” 
(390). In both instances, however, the individual subject remains, ultimately, exterior both to 
die Sache, whether that is the subject matter of a conversation or a text to be understood, and 
to language itself. “Language is the medium in which substantive understanding and agreement 
take place” (Gadamer 2004, 386; emphasis added), but, as Foran (2018, 91; emphasis in 
original) writes, “the crucial point of language” in Gadamer is that it nevertheless “precedes 
us.” In view of this, and in view of the fact that both language and dialogue can, and often do, 
fail us, “counter[ing] the subjective tendencies inherent” (Stanley et al. 2018, 9) in a 
hermeneutics thus conceived does indeed remain a task to be tackled, if not a riddle to be 
solved.
From a translaborative perspective, subjects as agents both of collaborative processes 
that result in an understanding “that is not only mine… but common” (Gadamer 2004, 390), 
and of translation processes that produce meaning rather than “subsequently put” an 
understanding of it “into words” (370) are, of course, of primary interest. Translaboration is, 
however, also centrally concerned with the conceptual as well as the practical confluence of 
collaborative and translational processes, and the sites of such confluences – whether in a 
translaborative “working across disciplines” (Zwischenberger 2017, 390) or in the translator’s 
“engagement with the multidimensionality of texts, languages and cultures” (Buden et al. 2009, 
218) – are, more often than not, texts. To conceive of the agents of translaboration, on the one 
hand, as preceded by language and, on the other, as exterior to the texts with which they engage 
and which they produce, however, runs the risk of creating a discursive no-man’s-land that 
leaves little scope for exploring interpretive agency as a supra-individual act of meaning-
making. 
A solution, I would argue, is to be found in the proponents of post-structuralist 
hermeneutics, notably in the work of Paul Ricoeur, whose writings have been explored 
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considerably less extensively in the context of translational hermeneutics than Gadamer’s. At 
the most fundamental level, Ricoeur argues, as Foran (2018, 98; see also Ricoeur 1976, 1–23) 
summarises, “that language must always be taken as ‘discourse’” and that a “text is a whole, a 
totality” (Ricoeur 1973, 106) that not only solely exists but can also only be explained and 
comprehended within “the sphere of signs” (105). Thus, “to understand a text is not to rejoin 
the author” (105) as it would be for Schleiermacher, nor is it to apprehend and appropriate die 
Sache (what is being written about) in some extratextual sphere of inter-subjective fusion; 
rather, it is a fundamentally textual operation that casts the interpreting subject as an irreducibly 
textual entity in itself. Put another way, by thinking about textual subject positions rather than 
about extra-textual subjectivities brought to bear on texts and their interpretations, the textually 
constituted subject is integrated into – indeed inherent in – the hermeneutic circle of 
interpretation and re-interpretation as a textual practice in and of itself. Understanding, in this 
scheme of things, does not flow from or through texts, but is situated squarely within them. It 
is on this basis also that, taking issue with Dilthey rather than Gadamer in this particular 
instance, Ricoeur (1973, 104) proposes a “dialectic involved in reading [that] expresses the 
originality of the relation between reading and writing and its irreducibility to the dialogical 
situation based on the immediate reciprocity between speaking and hearing.” For a contouring 
of the notion of translaboration, this allows us to expand the focus beyond concrete 
collaborations between multiple translators, or authors and translators, and to think about, and 
theorise, textual agents reading and writing each other within texts. For translational 
hermeneutics, translaboration thus conceived opens up the possibility not only of illuminating 
translation processes as text-bound collaborations that suspend “subjective tendencies” into 
what Maitland (2017, 38) calls a “hermeneutics of decipherment,” but also of moving towards 
a transdisciplinary relationship between philosophy and translation that does not aim at an 
immediately reciprocal dialogue so much as at a mutually translational endeavour.
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3. The trouble with philosophy
We will return to Ricoeur below, but to do so we need to take a closer look at how the 
relationship between translation and philosophy, and philosophical hermeneutics in particular, 
is commonly framed in Translation Studies. For example, many of the arguments presented in 
the two volumes from the Cologne symposia (Stolze, Stanley, and Cercel 2015; Stanley et al. 
2018), themselves prime examples of a productive dialogue between Philosophy and 
Translation Studies, focus on an application of philosophical hermeneutics to translation as a 
means of understanding “better, or differently (and in a valuably different way)” how we, as 
translators, “apprehend and process meaning, how we make use of meaning, and indeed go in 
search of it” (Stanley et al. 2018, 7). As a theory, or model, or indeed, as with Gadamer (2004), 
a method of “understand[ing] understanding” (Stanley et al. 2018, 7) through the prism of 
interpretation, it is easy to see why a dialogue with philosophical hermeneutics does indeed 
hold out the promise of getting to the bottom of some of the most fundamental processes 
involved in translation (see also Malmkjær 2010, 202). 
In the opening paper to the first symposium’s proceedings, however, Cercel, Stolze, 
and Stanley ponder the fact that the application of philosophical hermeneutics to Translation 
Studies is not an entirely straightforward operation because a 
characteristic feature of the philosophical dealing with the problem of translation is that, 
here, translation is primarily understood in an ontological sense and that the concrete 
work of translating is considered derivatively, as secondary to this primary concept. 
(Cercel, Stolze, and Stanley 2015, 22)
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In the introduction to the second symposium’s proceedings, the same authors, now also joined 
by O’Keeffe, again consider translation’s relationship with philosophical hermeneutics, 
wondering whether, “if interpretation, and translation, are ultimately practical undertakings, … 
the abstractions and conceptual frameworks of philosophical hermeneutics hamper or assist in 
gaining a better understanding of such practices?” (Stanley et al. 2018, 7). Blumczynski (2016, 
49) is similarly concerned that his chapter, “Philosophy: Translation as Understanding, 
Interpretation, and Hermeneutics”, has, fifteen pages in, “reached a high level of abstraction,” 
but then immediately reassures his readers “that reconceptualized insights from hermeneutics 
may also take us on unexpected trajectories when it comes to less abstract and practical 
phenomena.” 
Part of the problem, as Malmkjær (2010, 202) writes, lies in the fact that, for 
philosophers, “the question of translation is just one question… within the philosophy of 
language.” Consequently, 
philosophers are not especially interested in many of the issues that interest translation 
scholars, so we cannot expect to find in their writing any discussion of implications of 
their work for our discipline. These, we have to draw out ourselves. (ibid.)
For Malmkjær, much as for Basalamah (2018), the solution lies in the development of a 
philosophy of translation “as a branch of Translation Studies in its own right” (Malmkjær 2010, 
202), which could furnish the discipline with “a basic understanding of what translation is… 
and holds together our various theories of it and of its constituent concepts and descriptive 
notions” (204). At the applied end of the spectrum, Stolze, Stanley, and Cercel (2015, 24–30) 
propose – notably in active dialogue with a number of philosophers who do display an interest 
in the “implications of their work for our discipline” (Malmkjær 2010, 202) – the formulation 
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of a series of practice-based and translation-specific research questions that take account of six 
key concepts (subjectivity, historicity, phenomenology, process character, holistic nature of 
translation, and reflection) around which “to develop a methodology fitting to the hermeneutic 
approach” (Stolze, Stanley, and Cercel 2015, 30). This includes think-aloud protocols and other 
introspective methodologies designed to account for knowledge acquisition or to measure 
decision-making processes, as well as “experiments to check whether a previous input of a 
specific text will influence the translation later on of another” text (ibid.). These are ultimately 
rather empirical-looking solutions, however, and the extent to which they are capable of 
allaying the “significant level of distrust of hermeneutics in fields dominated by the empirical 
approach to research” (Stanley et al. 2018, 7) is open to debate. I would argue that neither 
Stolze’s (2012) meticulous mapping of translational competences and ‘orientations’ onto a 
matrix provided by philosophical hermeneutics, nor, for example, Stefanink and Bălăcescu’s 
(2017) invocation of the cognitive sciences in support of a hermeneutically inspired 
investigation of translational creativity ultimately counter the criticism that hermeneutics is an 
inexact science. Instead, and to account for the transdisciplinary and indeed translaborative 
continuities between philosophical hermeneutics and translation, both can and should be 
situated within a shared field of textual and discursive practice animated not merely by 
interdisciplinary dialogue but by a transdisciplinary “hermeneutics of decipherment” (Maitland 
2017, 38).
Nevertheless, Malmkjær (2010) and Stolze, Stanley, and Cercel (2015), among others, 
are right in stating that when philosophy explicitly references translation, it tends to use 
translation to frame philosophical questions or problems that are either only marginally or only 
at a very abstract level related to translational processes and practices, or are based, “in their 
surface claims” at least (Robinson 2015, 42), on reductive notions of what translation is and 
entails (see Blumczynski 2016, x–xi). 
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When Gadamer (2004, 398) writes that “no text and no book speaks if it does not speak 
a language that reaches the other person. Thus interpretation must find the right language if it 
really wants to make the text speak,” he conceives of this “right language” as a language that 
is common to the text and the interpreting subject and which, as we have seen above, both 
delimits our understanding and enables the dialogue necessary for establishing commonality in 
understanding. It is thus easy to see why, for Gadamer (2004, 387), translation constitutes – 
and, significantly in our context, is primarily evoked as – an “extreme case” of the hermeneutic 
motion of “coming to an understanding” through interpretation. Translation, writes Gadamer, 
“is like an especially laborious process of understanding” (388) given (a) that “the subject 
matter can scarcely be separated from the language” in which it was originally expressed (389; 
see also Foran 2018, 96), and (b) the translator’s “inevitable distance from the original,” a 
“distance between one’s own opinion and its contrary” that is “ultimately unbridgeable” 
(Gadamer 2004, 388; see, by contrast, Maitland 2017, 55–81 on the productive potential of 
active distanciation in the Ricoeurian sense). As a result, “every translation that takes its task 
seriously is at once clearer and flatter than the original” and even the most ingeniously inspired 
translation solution “can never be more than a compromise” (Gadamer 2004, 388). That said, 
Gadamer (389) does ponder the possibility that “perhaps… this description of the translator’s 
activity is too truncated,” presumably because the gloomy view of translation he previously 
sketched runs the risk of derailing the whole point of his brief excursus on translation in Truth 
and Method, which is to prove that “the situation of the translator and that of the interpreter are 
fundamentally the same.” Thus, Gadamer eventually settles on the figure of a “truly re-
creat[ive]” translator “who brings into language the subject matter that the text points to; but 
this means finding a language that is not only his but is also proportionate to the original” 
(ibid.).
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Ricoeur similarly talks relatively sparsely about translation in his wide body of 
philosophical writings, and explicitly so only towards the end of his long career and life, 
notably in On Translation (2006), his slim and posthumously published volume of three essays 
on the subject, a perusal of which, in isolation, seems to confirm Stanley et al.’s (2018, 7) 
misgivings about the limited applicability of philosophical hermeneutics to translation studies. 
In On Translation, Ricoeur (2006, 14) first uses translation – “a risky practice always in search 
of its theory” – as a paradigmatic case of “language’s reflection on itself, which made Steiner 
say that ‘to understand is to translate’” (28). Ricoeur’s is ultimately a plea for actively 
embracing the irreducible plurality – or “infinitude,” as Kharmandar (2015, 79) terms it – of 
language conceived as discourse, and for acknowledging in positive terms our ability to 
understand linguistically in spite of “identical meaning” (Ricoeur 2006, 22) being perpetually 
and, by necessity, elusive in discursive practice even within the same language. More 
importantly, however, translation as a paradigm for “language’s work on itself” (24) is, in a 
second step, developed into “a paradigm for ethical encounters between people and cultures” 
(Foran 2018, 100). Here, the notion of “linguistic hospitality… where the pleasure of dwelling 
in the other’s language is balanced by the pleasure of receiving the foreign word at home” 
(Ricoeur 2006, 10) becomes the central metaphor for both the relationship between same and 
other as dimensions of the self, and for European integration qua the work of remembrance 
and mourning. Foran (2018, 102), who gives a much fuller and eminently useful account of 
Ricoeur’s arguments in On Translation and attendant writings, is thus able to summarise that 
translation 
for Ricoeur reveals something fundamental about the human condition; not just that we 
speak languages and learn others but, more fundamentally, that our experience unfolds 
between the universal and the particular. Balancing these two modalities requires an 
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ethical engagement and openness to what is other. The fact of translation reveals that 
balancing the concerns of the one and the other is always possible, even if it remains an 
infinite task that can always take place in a different way.
In Ricoeur (2006), as in Gadamer (2004), translation is primarily invoked in the service of 
arguments concerned with something other than translation, though that in itself is no reason 
to dismiss or doubt the importance of these arguments to translation. Indeed, they can, and do, 
reverberate on translation in ways that undoubtedly enrich, and have enriched, our thinking 
about translation’s processes and practices as these intersect with questions about the nature of 
language, of meaning, of linguistic understanding, of interpretation and of translational ethics. 
However, from a translaborative perspective, and in the spirit of Blumczynski’s (2016, 29) 
argument in favour of a move away from “an arborescent epistemological paradigm” of 
interdisciplinarity and towards a “rhizomatic transdisciplinarity” (28), we need to pay attention 
not only to what philosophy says about translation, but also to what philosophy says when it is 
not explicitly talking about translation. 
In what I would see as a correlative move, Ricoeur (2007, 23), while avowedly 
considering translation “not… from the point of view of translation studies,” nevertheless 
displays a keen and genuine interest in how translators actually, practically “do it” (26) and 
argues that translation’s “struggle with plurality, its failures and successes, continues in spheres 
more and more distant from that of work… applied to language and languages” (29). For 
Ricoeur, “both the theoretical problem of translatability and the practical problem of the 
activity of translating” (26), taken together, reveal translation’s “paradigmatic character” (27), 
since translation’s “twofold problem: translation from one language to another and translation 
internal to some spoken language” (23) provides a textual matrix for deciphering a similarly 
twofold problem within philosophy (and, according to Brennan (2008), within hermeneutic 
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phenomenology in particular): “one that involves the encounter with the foreign and another 
that is about knowing how to say the same thing in a different way” (Brennan 2008). It is for 
this reason that Ricoeur (2007, 23) is able to state that “what is at stake for philosophy is how 
to model what is at work in the act of translating,” and it may well also be here that we find an 
entry point into the shared field of textual and discursive practice between Philosophy and 
Translation Studies that I posited earlier and that can be rendered productive, not so much by 
mere dialogue but by a mutual “hermeneutics of decipherment” (Maitland 2017, 38).
4. Transdisciplinary transfigurations
Relatively few translation scholars have so far engaged with Ricoeur’s post-structuralist 
hermeneutics beyond commenting on On Translation (2006). The most notable exception is 
Maitland, whose monograph What is Cultural Translation? (2017) builds on Ricoeur’s 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (1976) to arrive at a 
conceptualisation of translation as an act of interpretation that precedes rather than antecedes 
how we act in the world, and as an inherently emancipatory social practice directed “towards 
meaningful action and the transformation of the interpreting self” (Maitland 2017, 10). 
Maitland’s argument draws, at its base, on the double nature of symbolic meaning, “where the 
literal signification points to a second meaning that can be understood only by considering the 
reference of the first to the second” (37; see also Brennan 2008) – a typically Ricoeurian figure 
of thought that recurs across several of his major works, notably The Rule of Metaphor (1978) 
and Time and Narrative (1984–1988), and results in a rehabilitation of referentiality that has 
important implications for translation. Ricoeur’s argument essentially rests on the uncovering 
of a complex series of parallels between metaphor and narrative mimesis as both objects and 
conditions of textual (and textualised) understanding (see Taylor 2011) that render 
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referentiality productive, rather than merely reproductive, of meaning. Ricoeur conceives of 
metaphor as an essentially discursive practice that can, and indeed should, be viewed as a model 
of discourse. Rather than being “confined to a role of accompaniment, of illustration,” 
metaphor “participates in the invention of meaning” (Ricoeur 1991, 123) at the level of the text 
as a whole by bringing
to language aspects, qualities, and values of reality that lack access to language that is 
directly descriptive and that can be spoken only by means of the complex interplay 
between the metaphorical utterance and the rule-governed transgression of the usual 
meanings of our words. (Ricoeur 1984, 1:xi)
Mimesis, meanwhile, is, as Kharmandar (2015, 2018) explores from a vantage point similar to 
mine here, seen as the narrative correlative to metaphor in the realm of textual meaning-
making. In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur distinguishes between three stages or aspects of 
mimesis: Mimesis1 marks the point at which motives, goals and ethic qualities of human action 
become the immediate subject of narrative understanding. This first aspect of mimesis thus 
describes a state of prefiguration – what Valdés (1991, 28) calls the “pre-condition for 
textuality.” Mimesis2 denotes “the entry into the realm of the poetic composition,” a stage 
Ricoeur (1984, 1:xi) calls configuration. What finally emerges in mimesis3 is a new 
configuration by means of the mimetic refiguration of “the pre-understood order of action” 
(mimesis1) (ibid.). It is here that “the mimetic function of the plot rejoins metaphorical 
reference” (ibid.), and both operations partake in what Ricoeur calls “the paradox of productive 
reference” (Ricoeur 1991, 129) – the paradox, that is, of reference through redescription. Both 
metaphor and narrative mimesis thus produce meaning and “transform or transfigure reality” 
(ibid.) by creating their referents in the first place, along a seamless hermeneutic circle of 
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linguistic activity that perpetually pre-figures, configures and refigures – or, in Maitland’s 
(2017) scheme, distanciates, incorporates and transforms – motives, goals and ethical qualities 
of human action as the immediate subject of discursive understanding. 
This amounts, among other things, to a very effective counter-narrative to various 
critiques of representationalism and, as such, also has potentially profound implications for 
thinking about translation as something other than a derivative or in some way deviant textual 
practice, namely as work performed not on but within both source and target texts. As Taylor 
(2011, 112) writes, “in contrast to Gadamer, understanding [for Ricoeur] is not a product of 
commonality, whether presupposed or supposedly created dialogically” as we “do not finally 
hold in common language, meaning, history, tradition, or horizon.” Rather, for Ricoeur (2006, 
25), “there is something foreign in every other” and the human condition is one of “multiplicity 
at all the levels of existence” (33). Understanding, thus requires translation and, crucially, “the 
arbitration of retranslating” (Ricoeur 2007, 29), making translation “a task… not in the sense 
of a restricting obligation, but in the sense of the thing to be done so that human action can 
simply continue” (Ricoeur 2006, 19; emphasis in original).
It is here that translaboration comes back into focus, and where the “hermeneutics of 
decipherment” (Maitland 2017, 38) is finally animated through the “paradox of productive 
reference” between philosophy and translation. The notion of translaboration allows us to 
understand the hermeneutic task of mutually productive decipherment between these two 
discursive fields not only as a collaborative endeavour of redescription among a network of 
interpretative agents, but also, and more fundamentally, as textual labour. In “The Function of 
Fiction in Shaping Reality,” Ricoeur (1991, 129; emphases added) writes that “fiction reveals 
its ability to transform and transfigure reality only when it is inserted into something as a 
labour, in short, when it is a work.” The same can be, and effectively is, said for translation 
(Ricoeur 2006, 22). Translation is, of course, an inherently productive practice: productive of 
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textual commodities which in themselves function as tokens of commercial, cultural, 
disciplinary, social or political exchange and productivity, as well as productive, rather than 
merely reproductive, of meaning. For Ricoeur, however, the work of translation is also allied 
to the psychoanalytic category of ‘working through’ as a process of repeating, elaborating and 
amplifying interpretations (Ricoeur 2006, 22; see Ricoeur 2007, 24). Such mimetic work of 
translation produces – between texts as well as between disciplines – “equivalence without 
identity” (Ricoeur 2006, 22) much as “only the image which does not already have its referent 
in reality is able to display a world” (Ricoeur 1991, 129). It is the site of a perpetual articulation 
of textual, discursive, and thus also disciplinary polysemy – an articulation, however, that is 
not the result of any immediately reciprocal dialogue, but of a mutually translaborative 
endeavour in which, to quote Ricoeur slightly out of context, “great textual ensembles meet 
and meet again in my reading, giving rise, through a mutual interpretation, to attempts at 
translating one ensemble into the other” (Ricoeur 2007, 30). 
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